return to top
t What was Operation Defensive Shield?
In the final days of March 2002, Israel was forced to defend itself against an unprecedented series of terrorist attacks. Operation Defensive Shield was aimed at ending the almost daily attacks on civilians, terrorism so deadly that no sovereign state could refrain from reacting.
By the end of March 2002, the Israeli population had already suffered through 18 months of continuous Palestinian violence and terrorism. However, nothing could prepare them for the wave of shootings, roadside attacks and incessant suicide bombings that triggered Operation Defensive Shield.
©2002 Reuters Passover seder suicide bombing in Netanya (Mar 27, 2002)
| |
Undoubtedly, this period's most egregious act of terrorism was the March 27th suicide bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya in which 29 Jews were killed as they sat down to celebrate the Passover Seder. Yet this attack, which took place on one of the holiest nights in the Jewish calendar, was not an isolated event. During "Bloody March", Palestinian terrorists killed more that 130 people in Israel. Among the dead were 12 children and 26 elderly persons.
These horrific statistics tell only part of the story. The terrorist attacks had become so overwhelming that almost every aspect of daily life in Israel was fraught with very real danger. More significantly, due to the close knit nature of Israel's society, almost every Israeli was personally affected by the growing list of casualties. Taken proportionally, 130 Israeli deaths would equal well over a thousand dead in France or over six thousand Americans killed - and all in the space of one month. No nation could remain silent in the face of these mounting civilian casualties.
While Israel yearns for a diplomatic solution to the conflict with the Palestinians, it was left with no choice but to react through military means. Every state, including Israel, has the right to self-defense, and every state, including Israel, has the duty to protect the lives of its citizens.
Operation Defensive Shield, which was decided upon at a special Cabinet session on March 28th, was launched in order to counter the extreme escalation in Palestinian terrorism. The Operation's aim was to attack the infrastructure of Palestinian terrorism in all its parts and components. Israel hoped to apprehend as many terrorists as possible, to uncover and destroy arms caches and bomb-making laboratories, and to gather the intelligence necessary to prevent future attacks.
In order to effectively attack the infrastructure of terrorism, the Israel Defense Forces [IDF] were forced to operate in densely populated areas, since the terrorists chose to conceal their activities by hiding them in the heart of the civilian population. During the previous 18 months, Israel had made every effort to avoid extensive operations in these areas. When urban operations finally became unavoidable, the IDF took maximum care to prevent harm to Palestinian civilians, often risking the lives of its soldiers to do so. Israel preferred to employ infantry in house-to-house searches, rather than rely upon heavier weapons which, while protecting the lives of the soldiers, would place Palestinian civilians at greater risk. The high moral standards demonstrated by Israeli soldiers during battle stands in sharp contrast to that of the terrorists, who deliberately chose to hide behind their fellow Palestinians. Israel paid a heavy price for its principles. During Operation Defensive Shield, 29 IDF soldiers were killed (23 of these in Jenin alone) and 127 were wounded.
In the course of the three week operation, the IDF succeeded in capturing many wanted terrorists, while others were killed in the fighting. Thousands of guns and rifles were seized, as were large amounts of explosives and other tools of terrorism. Many explosive belts - ready for use by suicide bombers - were found and two dozen bomb-making laboratories were uncovered.
During and immediately following Operation Defensive Shield, Israelis enjoyed a period of relative calm. The cycle of almost daily terror attacks had been - at least temporarily - broken. While it is not possible to determine exactly how many acts of terrorism were prevented by the operation, one can only imagine the consequences had Israel refrained from acting, allowing the terrorists a free hand to carry out further atrocities. Given the frequency of terrorist acts that immediately preceded March 28th, it is apparent that many civilian lives were saved by the IDF operation.
Still, the terrorist infrastructure was so entrenched in Palestinian Authority areas that no single operation could destroy it, and bloody acts of Palestinian terrorism resumed.
return to top
t What happened in Jenin?
When the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) entered the refugee camp in the West Bank city of Jenin during Operation Defensive Shield, they encountered dozens of heavily armed terrorists shielding themselves behind Palestinian civilians. 23 Israeli soldiers, who risked their lives to avoid harming non-combatants, died in the fierce battle which ensued, while Palestinian casualties amounted to 56 (the vast majority of them armed terrorists). There were not hundreds or even thousands of civilian casualties, as the PA had originally claimed, and the Palestinian allegations of a 'massacre' were found to be completely baseless.
©IDF Spokesman Aerial photographs of combat zone in Jenin (April 2002)
| |
Jenin's terror industry - with its command centers, explosives laboratories and arms caches - has produced over two dozen suicide bombers and countless other armed terrorists. Prior to Operation Defensive Shield, the IDF had avoided entering Jenin's refugee camp, a small yet densely population section of the city. However, the appalling increase in attacks in March 2002 left Israel with no option but to strike at the terrorist infrastructure sheltered within the camp.
Jenin's refugee camp was not only a staging area of Palestinian suicide terrorism, it was also the site chosen by the armed terrorists to serve as a battleground against Israeli forces. These terrorists had prepared the field well, extensively booby-trapping houses and streets, and setting up sniper positions within civilian homes and structures. They acted with no regard for the safety of the camp's inhabitants or their property, and encouraged residents, including children, to take an active role in the fighting.
Shortly after the battle began, PA spokespersons proclaimed worldwide that Israeli forces had committed a "massacre" in Jenin. The Palestinians originally said that 3,000 civilians had been killed, but gradually reduced their claim to about 500. A few weeks later, after questions began to be raised in the international media, a high-ranking Fatah official was forced to admit that the death toll numbered only in the dozens. Kadoura Mousa Kadoura, the Director of the northern West Bank for Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement, told reporters that his own investigation showed that 56 Palestinians had died in Jenin during the operation. These were largely armed fighters, killed during combat. The subsequent report by the UN Secretary General, which found no evidence of a massacre, could only verify 52 Palestinian casualties.
The "Jenin massacre" myth is particularly galling since the IDF took great care to avoid harming innocent non-combatants, even though this increased the exposure of its own soldiers to risk. The IDF chose to employ infantry in house-to-house sweeps rather than using heavier weapons which, while providing Israeli troops with greater security, would also increase the risk to the civilian Palestinian population. Israel paid a heavy price for this decision - 23 Israeli soldiers were killed and dozens more were injured in the fierce close combat that ensued.
The Palestinian Authority's unfounded allegations of a massacre combined with misrepresentative television pictures of heavy damage - which in actuality was confined to a limited section of the refugee camp - persuaded the international community to embark upon a UN investigation of events in Jenin. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan then initiated the formation of a fact-finding team to develop accurate information regarding the events in Jenin. Due to its high regard for the UN Secretary General, Israel immediately announced its support for UN Security Council Resolution 1405, which welcomed the Secretary General's initiative.
However, Israel believed that a number of points had to be clarified prior to the arrival of the team in order to safeguard the impartiality of the team's work. Israel believed that the team's mandate had to include an examination of Palestinian terrorism in the camp that created the necessity for Israel's military actions there. The right to self-defense, and the obligation to combat terrorism, could not be ignored. Israel expected that the Security Council definition of the mission as a "fact-finding" team would be preserved and that the practices of previous UN fact-finding efforts be maintained, including with regard to respect for the identity and rights of individuals providing information. While Israel had every intention of sharing information with the team, in the fight against terrorism, some information must remain classified and it would have been unreasonable to expect Israel to expose all of its security and operational secrets upon demand.
As satisfactory terms of reference could not be agreed upon, Secretary General Kofi Annan decided to disband the fact-finding team. By this time, respectable news outlets the world over and human rights organization finally confirmed what Israel had stated from the beginning - that there had been no massacre in Jenin.
Unfortunately, the Palestinians continue their attempts to perpetuate the Jenin massacre myth, often adding unfounded allegations regarding the denial of vital humanitarian aid. In clear contradiction to their own claims, the Palestinians often spread these lies in the same breath that they refer to the refugee camp as "Jeningrad", a modern Stalingrad-like last stand, and the site of a great and heroic battle.